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Proverbs
William Ian Miller
Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions
by Jon Elster.
Cambridge, 450 pp., £14.95, March 1999, 0 521 64487 9

Suppose that 16 years ago you had written not one but two superlative books. Would you suffer
from anxiety of influence with regard to early versions of yourself, as if, to twist Harold Bloom,
your early self now played an insurmountably glorious Milton to your later romantic phases? Did
Shakespeare say to himself: ‘No way I can beat Hamlet, so why write again?’ Jon Elster wrote two
gems in the 1970s and 1980s, Ulysses and the Sirens and Sour Grapes. Not that they have deterred him
from publishing at a stupendous rate since, though he has never recaptured that earlier
refulgence. In Alchemies of the Mind, he explicitly means to revisit Sour Grapes, to add emotions to the
more unabashed rational-choice style of the earlier work. What he gains in nuance he loses in
freshness and surprise, but not all that much. If Sour Grapes was his Hamlet, Alchemies is his Cymbeline;
the book is too long, but it gives much pleasure and instruction.
Alchemies is a collection of five substantial essays, almost five books in one. All but the first feature
the role the emotions play in behaviour and mental life, and all of them develop a multitude of
related themes rather than hammer home a single thesis. The essays delve into the perversities of
human motivation and desire – wishful thinking, counter-wishful thinking (‘if I bury the treasure
here someone is sure to discover it’), sour grapes, forbidden fruit, the grass is greener – especially
as they play havoc with rationality. One even detects a certain grim delight (or am I projecting?)
that experimental psychology has finally proved what we already suspected: that the depressed see
the world as it really is; self-esteem is mostly delusional. Truth and happiness are like pygmies and
cranes, incessantly at war with each other.
Unusual for a theorist of any stripe these days, Elster has read books, especially by those writers
whose most telling virtue is their eye for human foolishness and knavery. Nothing as strong as
Swift, but he is addicted to those exposers of knavery, La Rochefoucauld and Stendhal, and those
exposers of foolishness, Jane Austen and Montaigne; all have major speaking parts in Elster’s play.
In fact, his usual audience of economists, political scientists and psychologists are liable to take
exception to his overt pleas for belletrism. In disciplines that frown on any citation that is older
than a decade, Montaigne stands no better chance than Erving Goffman. Wheels are reinvented
with astounding regularity – if we’re lucky; just as often we lose the skills and talents to reinvent
them or reinvent them looking more like triangles and squares.
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Elster’s first essay – ‘A Plea for Mechanisms’ – concedes, given the perversities and complexities of
human motivation, the impossibility of lawlike generalisations in the social sciences and instead
argues for a more modest means of explaining human behaviour short of admitting total defeat by
settling for ‘mere description’. I’ve never understood what this bugbear of ‘mere description’ is. If
only a few illustrious theorists in the social sciences and especially the humanities would go in for
it a little more, for clarity’s sake or to prove to us that they actually know something before they
begin to theorise.
Elster tries to construct a middle position which history, some anthropology and good social
theory has always occupied. He takes his best examples of mechanisms from Tocqueville. A
mechanism is a causal pattern, a causal story, that cannot predict like a law but can supply sense
after the fact. Many mechanisms have the form of proverbs and it is to Elster’s credit that, rather
than take that as a cause for dismissing his observations as so much folk psychology, he
celebrates, within limits, proverbial psychological wisdom. No trite social constructionist mantras
about there being no such thing as common sense, the presence of so many of the same proverbs
across time and space gives the mantra the lie. Proverbial expressions – sour grapes, forbidden
fruit, out of sight out of mind and so on – give accounts of behaviour that let us answer the
question ‘why did he do that?’
Elster delights in paradox. Almost every proverb has another proverb that points in the opposite
direction. And no wonder, for in so many settings it’s just as likely for someone to do X as minus
X. Such contrary possibility is often lodged at the core of our being. When afraid, we can fight as
easily as take flight. We can’t tell who will attack and who will retreat, but we have an account for
whichever happens once it has happened. Similarly, we can identify the mechanism, again after
the fact, that lets one child raised by alcoholics become a teetotaller and another follow in his
parents’ footsteps. Not all mechanisms come in proverbial pairs but the ones that do are the ones
that motivate Elster to his most interesting observations and make him seem a radical
indeterminist at times when that is precisely what he would wish to avoid.
The next essay – ‘Emotions before Psychology’ – is a polemic mostly directed at social science.
The claim is baldly stated: we can learn more about the emotions from moralists, novelists and
playwrights than from the cumulative finds of scientific psychology. Don’t snigger, Freudians and
Lacanians. Elster finds only mystification, banality and error among you; and many readers will
welcome the lucidity and benefits of talking about our experience of the world using the language
of passions – anger, fear, envy, shame – rather than that of ‘le petit objet a’, ‘le Nom du Père’, even
id and superego. So-called theory in literary and cultural studies could do worse than attend to
Elster, or any number of books written before 1800.
Elster concedes that scientific psychology has done better with emotions like fear and surprise
than with envy, shame, hope, relief and pity, but can anyone deny his larger claim? He credits
Aristotle, with considerable justice, with the most perspicacious philosophic discussion of the
emotions. My own nominee for that role would be Adam Smith in his Theory of Moral Sentiments,
which Elster surprisingly ignores. But he makes his case forcefully by letting loose Montaigne, La
Rochefoucauld, Austen, George Eliot and Stendhal. He has an eye for the perfect quotation and
sends you back to these writers better equipped to read them.
Few are as good as the French moralists at fathoming the ways of vanity, pridefulness, hypocrisy
and self-deception. If the moralists had nothing to recommend them other than their studied
mistrust of all aspects of satisfaction and self-satisfaction, that should be enough to recommend
them, caught as we are in an age of low-cal self-esteem. Elster treats us instead to the wisdom of
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the moralists, especially on amour-propre, adding to theirs his own by reading them astutely and
generously.
Sometimes too generously. The moralists, Elster says, were highly aware of ‘the paradox of
honour’, which is ‘that people seek the esteem of those whom they do not themselves esteem.’ But
he lets the moralists off too easily by joining them in picking on the target of the vain honourseeker. There are competing mechanisms at work here that Elster ignores. When those below us
esteem us we often find them more discerning and wiser than they at first appeared to us. But
then a contrary effect sets in; we suspect that the real reason they are beneath us to begin with is
that they are so undiscerning as not to discern our fakery. The wheel of fortune effect, too, is at
work. Those below us now will sometimes be above us; we take turns in the relative rankings and
when they are up, they will then be enviable and we will esteem them for the position they hold
above us.
A long essay – ‘Social Emotions in Historical Context’ – is largely a treatment of honour, envy,
shame and guilt, with extended discussions of ancient Greece, saga Iceland, 19th-century Corsica.
Elster wisely refuses to see shame as simply a cost to be borne in a rational cost-benefit analysis. ‘A
person who thought of shame as a cost, similar to a parking fine, would probably not feel any.’ He
is not given to bland pieties; it is a consistent virtue of his writing to follow out the necessary
consequences of his arguments. So it is with some surprise that one finds him accepting the
ancient moralisms regarding envy. ‘Compared with the praise of the good by the good, the
enjoyment of [others’] envy [of us] is like ashes in the mouth.’ But isn’t the enjoyment of the envy
others may have for us a lot more pleasant than ashes in the mouth? Praise that doesn’t cost the
praise-giver anything to give lacks conviction. Doesn’t their envy of us imbue with sincerity
whatever praise they might give us? Envy is no less sincere than imitation.
Elster takes me to task on one point in my account of honour in an otherwise generous treatment
of my work on saga Iceland, and in good saga idiom ‘I would scarcely be a man’ if I did not tax him
somewhat in return. Elster wants to distinguish glory, a pure positional good – more for me
means less for you – from honour, which can be more than zero sum – more for me may not mean
less for you. But the Icelanders made no such distinction, nor the Greeks or Corsicans either for
all I can tell; they saw the whole world of honour as fixed, or as less than zero sum. Hence the
belief that the heroes of old were always grander than any of the present day; there is less honour
to go around now than before. The point is not that two male combatants cannot both come away
from a duel with their honour enhanced, it is that someone still has to pay the price. One saga
example shows the honour both principal male adversaries gain to have been funded by their
lesser ranked constituents, by their women and servants. Elster says this is implausible since the
women are not players in the honour game. But honour is not just a play among men, it is also
about keeping women and slaves in their place by asserting the entire male honour system against
them. And when two men both walk away from an encounter looking good it is not unusual for
them to claim that they did so because they knew better than to act like brawling slaves or
squabbling, irrational women. The male honour system thus gets an influx of moral funds to
distribute by kicking the low in the teeth. In other words, there is a gendered story to tell about
how the male ethic of honour is situated in feuding culture which Elster is blind to.
The fourth essay – ‘Rationality and the Emotions’ – is as good an introduction to the study of the
emotions as any I know. It is well-informed, judicious and consistently acute. The literature on
emotions still hasn’t come to terms with whether there is a ‘real’ category that can include such
disparate things as love, disgust, regret, boredom, but not sexual desire, pain, thirst or hunger.
Few of us, however, who accept that there is a group of affects called emotions will agree on what
to include; and emotion theorists’ lists of the basic emotions are as varied as are emotion
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theorists. Many individual emotions provide enough matter for a volume each. Think how rich –
socially, psychologically and morally – sentiments like disgust, envy, shame and anger are. Even
the emotion of relief exfoliates beyond belief: why is so much pleasure as much a matter of relief
as simple joy? Relief when you stop banging your head against the wall, relief when an impending
disaster veers off or fails to materialise, relief at escaping the boring colleague heading in your
direction, makes you feel better than the neutral position you were in before whichever disaster
loomed. We find solace in thinking just how much worse off we could have been.
With such material, how can anyone go wrong? Well, just try reading emotions studies; many do
go wrong. Elster is a relief, because of his eye for the interesting, his crisp manner of presentation
and his way of developing the big issues – the passions’ relation to reason and interest – by means
of concrete examples drawn from history and literature. He joins many in arguing that emotions
are more than just feeling states or are reducible to chemical and electrical effects in brain
circuitry. Emotions are intimately connected with cognition and they have intentional objects:
they are about something. He aligns himself with the traditional view that emotions are
undergone, that we are more or less at their mercy, that we cannot choose them. His treatment of
their appropriateness, however, is thinly limited to the proper relation between emotions and the
beliefs that give rise to them, rather than to the Smithian issue of the proper display and
modulation of emotion. Though we may not quite be able to choose our emotions, we have
considerable control over the extent to which we show them or whether to fake them. Proper
socialisation is a function of gaining competence in managing their display.
Elster makes room for unconscious emotions (he calls them ‘proto-emotions’), a tricky notion: in
what way can an emotion be entirely unconscious given that feelings are involved? He argues for
weak proto-emotions – those for which the relevant culture has no concept – and strong protoemotions: those that a person might become aware of and probably will, since the culture has
made the concept available, though the person currently does not recognise what others can
readily observe about him – that he is in their grip. With his dizzying propensity to taxonimise,
Elster even adds semi-strong proto-emotions: when the emotion is available in the culture but
something in the person won’t let him access it. Here we seem to enter the world of the still very
useful Freudian notions of sublimation and repression, though Elster would prefer not to talk that
way.
To those who think of the Elster of Ulysses and Sour Grapes as trying to save rational choice from its
friends in economics departments, this Elster goes farther and rejects the notion that the
emotions can meaningfully figure in any intrapersonal cost-benefit analysis. The interaction
between emotions, interest and reason is more complex than simple theories of rational actors
and homo economicus would ever let it be. These interactions are the topic of his last chapter, from
which the book takes its title. Here Elster distinguishes between the unconscious transmuting of
our motives into more acceptable ones and the conscious misrepresentation of our motives, the
first the mechanism of tricking ourselves, the latter the mechanism of tricking others. But
transmutation and misrepresentation mix and mingle. Both are, in La Rochefoucauld’s idiom, the
homage vice pays to virtue. The desire to look good to others and to look good to ourselves
imposes enormous burdens on the way we pose, posture and argue our interests. Bending the
body and the tongue so as to be estimable and self-estimable sets in motion strange alchemies in
which we start to accord our actual motives and beliefs with what we say. What starts out a fake
ends up with us a bit more decent than we supposed ourselves to be. Lip service has the capacity
to become service itself, as intolerant orthodox authorities have long known. Just saying the credo
is enough to make most of us safe and sound.
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Much of what we think of as the blatant, convictionless hypocrisy of politicians is better described
in Tocqueville’s words as ‘the creation of ephemeral convictions in accordance with the feelings
and interests of the moment’. Convictions of some sort there are. The present American President
can sincerely believe contradictory propositions uttered within minutes of each other. For Elster,
‘durable and consciously hypocritical stances are probably quite rare.’ So great is our capacity for
self-deception that the trickster ends up undone by his own tricks. Consider, too, what this means
to the compulsive ironist. He simply becomes what he appears to be; there is no deeper self
obscured by the shifting poses, the wit or the mockery; the ironist is all surface, having hidden the
inner self for so long that neither he nor anyone else can find it. But Elster’s achievement is to
show that the 17th and 18th century’s clearly accessible idiom of passions, interests and reason, is
a very good way of talking about our inner states and the relation they bear to our words and
deeds. Our era seems to have rejected, if not quite lost, real psychological wisdom in favour of
mystifying visions that see us as having one interest only: getting laid. Smith, Mandeville, Austen,
Montaigne, please help.
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